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Recent Cases
BILLS AND NOTES-FICTITIOUS PAYEE.

First National Bank v. Produce Exchange Bank'

Ben T. Wilson handled the banking transactions for several interrelated Kansas City
construction companies. He filled out a check on one of the companies for $1,000 payable to
plaintiff bank and had C. J. Brown, the secretary and treasurer of the company, sign it.
Wilson took this check to plaintiff bank and by his direction, plaintiff's exchange teller
prepared a cashier's check for $1,000 payable to James Edgar, an existing person intended by
Wilson to have no interest in the check. 2 Upon completion of the instrument Wilson indorsed
the name of James Edgar on it, signed his own name as an indorser and deposited it to his
credit in defendant bank. Defendant sent the check through the clearing house to plaintiff
who paid it. In like manner two other checks for $1,000 each were drawn and honored by
plaintiff. Defendant, as a member of the clearing house association, had agreed with the
association to take up on demand any item bearing a forged indorsement which was cleared
for the defendant. Plaintiff, claiming the indorsement by Wilson was a forgery, brought
this action to recover the amount paid to defendant in honoring the checks.
By statute an instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fic titious or non-existing person and such fact was known to the person making it so payable.*
The trial court held that Wilson was the person making the instrument payable to a fictitious
payee and thus that his indorsement was not a forgery since the check in that case would be
payable to bearer. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's holding. The same conclusion was reached in the first hearing before the Supreme Court. At this hearing a distinction
was drawn between this case and American Sash and Door Co. v. Commerce Trust
Co. 4 In that case a pay roll clerk made up the pay roll, and from it a bookkeeper wrote out
checks which were signed by the treasurer. The pay roll clerk padded the pay roll with
fictitious names, and when the checks to the fictitious persons were made and signtid he
indorsed and cashed them. There it was held the treasurer's knowledge controlled in determining whether the instrument was payable to bearer. Upon rehearing of the principal
case, the Supreme Court held that it was analogous to the American Sash and Door Co. case.
Thus it found that plaintiff's teller was the person making the instrument "so payable".
By this holding Wilson's indorsement would be a forgery since the teller did not know the
payee was fictitious. Therefore the court held for plaintiff.
The court's apparent difficulty in deciding this case can be explained, for while decisions
in other jurisdictions are in accord, 5 there is considerable plausibility in the opposite view.
In the Ymerican Sash and Door Co. case the treasurer had no intention of drawing the
checks according to the will of the pay roll clerk. Instead, he intended to make the checks
1. 89 S. W. (2d) 33 (Mo. 1935).
2. The law is well established that the
payee named in an instrument will be
deemed fictitious though designating an
existing person, if there was no intent that
he should have a beneficial interest in the
paper. Snyder v. Corn Exchange National
Bank, 221 Pa. 559, 70 Ad. 876 (1908);
Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., 294
Fed. 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); United States
Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank,
343 Ill. 503, 175 N. E. 825 (1931); American
Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co.,
332 Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1932);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal. v.

Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 1
Cal. App. (2d) 694, 37 P. (2d) 483 (1934).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 2638.
4. 332 Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034
(1932).
5. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Bank of
America, 193 N. Y. 26 85 N. E. 829 (1908);
Robertson Banking o. v. Brasfield, 202
Ala. 167, 79 So. 651,(1918); American Express Co. v. People's Savings Bank, 192
Iowa 366, 181 N. W. 701 (1921); City of St.
Paul v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 151 Minn.
485, 187 N. W. 516 (1922); City Nat. Bank
of Mexia v. First Nat. Bank of Wortham,
20 S. W. (2d) 212 (Tex. 1929).

(186)

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1936], Art. 6
RECENT CASES
payable only to men who had actually worked for the company. In the present case the
intention of the teller was to make the check payable according to the will or caprice of
Wilson. If Wilson had directed the check to be made payable to bearer it would have been
so made. His will was the sole controlling factor in determining to whom the check should
be drawn. It is to be noted that while the statute says only the knowledge and not the in,ention of the person making the instrument "so payable" can be looked to in determining
whether the instrument is payable to bearer, the intentions of the parties can certainly be
considered here since the purpose for such consideration is only to determine who is the
person making the instrument "so payable". It seems, then, that some basis does exist upon
which these cases can be distinguished, and that it would not be entirely inconsistent with
the dmerican Sash and Door Co. case to hold that Wilson was the one who made the check
payable to the fictitious payee.
The principal case is quite similar to the situation where the drawer leaves the name of
the payee blank and a fictitious name is filled in by some one else. There, courts hold the
one filling in the name is the person making the instrument "so payable". 6 While in the
present case Wilson did not perform the physical act of writing the fictitious name, still he
had as free a hand in choosing the payee as did the person who filled in the blank. In view
of these facts it does not seem unreasonable to say that Wilson was the person who made the
instrument payable to the fictitious payee and that there was no forgery here.
The drawer-drawee bank, in this case, is secured by payment from the purchaser of the
cashier's check. If that payment were made by check and the check be worthless the bank
would ordinarily have an action only against the purchaser. But if the purchaser had the
cashier's check made payable to a fictitious person without the knowledge of the bank, then
under the court's holding, the bank would have an action against a bona fide purchaser for
value and without notice, to whom the bank, as drawee, had paid the checky Since the
drawer-drawee bank was instrumental in creating the cashier's check and had adequate
opportunity to secure itself, it would not seem unfair to let it stand the loss as against a
bona fide purchaser. Thus, while the present opinion can be substantiated by the holdings
in other jurisdictions, the opposite view certainly has some merit.
JOHN H. FOARD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-PRI vILEOES AND IMMUNITIES OF A CITIZEN OF THE
UNITED STATES.

Colgate v. Harvey1
An income and franchise tax statute of the state of Vermont contained a provision imposing a tax on net income received from securities, but exempting from taxation net income
received from loans made within the state at an interest rate not exceeding 5 per cent. 2 The
statute was attacked on the ground that it violated the equal protection and the privileges
and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 6 to 3 decision, the Supreme
Court of the United States sustained that contention as to the section containing the exemption provision. After recognizing the principle that the equal protection clause does not
forbid a reasonable classification in matters of taxation, 3 Justice Sutherland, writing the
6. Tri-Bullion Smelting & Development Co. v. Curtis; 174 N. Y. Supp. 830
(1919); Rancho San Carlos Inc. v. Bank of
Italy, 123 Cal. App. 291, 11 P. (2d) 424
(1932).
7. Lieber v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 137 Mo.
App. 158, 117 S. W. 672 (1909); Miners &

Merchants' Bank v. St. Louis Smelting &
Refining Co., 178 S. W. 211 (Mo. 1915);
State v. Broadway Nat. Bank, 153 Tenn.
113, 282 S. W. 194 (1926); Home Ins. Co. v.
Mercantile Trust Co., 219 Mo. App. 645,
284 S. W. 834 (1926); Endilich v. Bank of
Battle Creek, 200 Wis. 175, 227 N. W. 866
(1929).
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1. 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935).
2. Vt. Laws 1931, No. 17, § 3.
3. American Sugar Refining Co. v.
Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900); Clement
National Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120
(1913); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Wisconsin, 247 U. S.132 (1918); Maxwell v.

Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919); Heisler v.

Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922);
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton,
262 U. S. 413 (1923); Lacoste v. Department of Conservation of State of Louisiana,
263 U. S. 545 (1924); Roberts & Schaefer
Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50 (1926);
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 (1931);

2
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majority opinion, indicated that the inequality here was not proper. He stated that the
classification had no fair relation to the object of the act, which was only to collect revenue,
no other public purpose being named. He went on to say that assuming some other public
purpose might be served, the provision was invalid by reason of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That conclusion was denounced in a dissenting
opinion written by Justice Stone, and concurred in by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.
Following a denial that this particular discrimination contravened the equal protection
clause, he attacked that part of the majority opinion which relied on the privileges and
immunities clause. 4 He stated that the clause has never been held to afford protection to
any form of interstate transaction, but has been limited to the protection of interests
"growing out of the relationship between the citizen and the national government, created
by the Constitution and federal laws."
It has repeatedly been declared that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends only to rights arising from the Constitution and laws of the
United States.5 Yet the decision in the principal case declares that the investment of money
outside the state is included in this category. This conclusion was reached by drawing an
analogy to the right to pass freely from state to state, which right is protected by the clause
in question. 6 It is difficult to see the similarity in the two situations, for the court expressly
holds that it is a privilege of a citizen of the United States to loan money outside the state
"whether in so doing he remains in Vermont or not." The finding is especially interesting
in view of the fact that this seems to be the first case which has held a state statute invalid
under the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amentment.7 From the language of the case it is difficult to determine exactly how far the court intended to go. It is
not altogether clear whether the court meant that it is beyond the power of a state to enact
any tax on income received from loans outside the state, or that the tax here was unconstitutional because discriminatory, or that it was invalid because the basis of the classification was unreasonable. As indicating the first view, the court said the power to tax this
income is the power absolutely to preclude loans outside the state, and a state is forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment from prohibiting a lawful loan of money in another state.
If the court intended to go that far in its decision, it limits the taxing power of the states in a
situation which even the commerce clause has never been held to cover. That clause does
not invalidate a tax solely because it is levied on net income derived from interstate transactions. 8 It is more probable that this tax was held invalid because it discriminated against
loans not made within the state, since the court said "the discriminatory tax here imposed
abridges the privileges of a citizen of the United States." As Justice Stone points out, neither
the equal protection nor due process clauses require exact equality of taxation. If the maState Board of Tax Commissioners of Indi-

ana v. Jackson, 282 U. S. 527 (1931);
Lawrence v. State Tax Commissioners of
Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276 (1932); Union
Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, 288 U. S. 181
(1933).
4. Justice Stone said, "Feeble indeed is
an attack on a statute as denying equal
protection which can gain any support from
the almost forgotten privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. 36
(1872); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 (1892);
Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657 (1893);
Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377 (1894);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908);
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919);
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (1921);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek,
259 U. S. 530 (1922); Hamilton v. Regents

of University of California, 293 U. S. 245
(1934).
6. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S. 35
(1867) (though decided before the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case
held this a right of national citizenship);
see Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274
(1900).
7. Justice Stone said, "Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least
44 cases have been brought to this Court
in which state statutes have been assailed
as infringements of the privileges and
immunities clause. Until today, none has
held that state legislation infringed that
clause."
8. United States Glue Co. v. Town of
Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S.
113 (1920); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Doughton, 262 U. S. 413 (1923).
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jority's real objection to the tax is its discriminatoryfeature, he predicts that the privileges
and immunities clause will become "an inexhaustible source of immunities, incalculable in
their benefit to taxpayers and in their harm to local government, by imposing on the states
the heavy burden of an exact equality of taxation wherever transactions across state lines
may be involved." The only other possibility is that the tax was held unconstitutional
because the classification it adopted was unreasonably discriminatory. However, that situation is adequately covered by the equal protection clause, which forbids a classification in
matters of taxation if such classification does not have a reasonable relation to the objects
9
of the legislation. The majority of the court said that clause was contravened in this case.
It indicated that a different decision might have been reached had the exemption applied
only to income received from money invested in Vermont property. The court reasoned
that in that situation a public purpose would be served through a resulting increase of wealth
within the state. Would not a similar line of reasoning uphold the provision in question? The
exemption would tend to encourage loans within the state, and, as the dissent argued,
it is not for the court to say that the presence of such funds would not benefit local industry
through a lowering of interest rates.
Because of the new life it infuses into the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and because of the additional limitation it imposes on state power,
at least in the field of taxation, this case may well have far-reaching effects.

W. L.

NELSON, JR.

CONTRACTS-CLAUSES IN RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE IN TEACHERS' CONTRACTS.
1

Taggart v. School District No. 52, Carroll County

Plaintiff was suing to recover wages allegedly due her under a teaching contract. The
contract contained the following clause: "Be it further agreed that the party of the First
Part, declares that she is not married, and that if she should become married at any time
during the school term of 1933-34, she shall immediately resign her position as teacher and
this contract shall become null and void." Plaintiff was married at the time when she signed
this contract, but the Kansas City Court of Appeals permitted her to recover, saying that
the courts of the state had long held such clauses "arbitrary, unreasonable, and void."
Supporting its decision with no discussion as to why the clause was void, the court cited only
the earlier Missouri case of Byington v. School District of Joplin.2 However, the decision in
this latter case did not rest upon the question of whether the board of education had the
power to make and enforce a rule in regard to marriage, or if it did have such power, whether
the rule was a reasonable or valid one. The court specifically said that the appellant took no
exceptions to the finding of the court below on that question and that the question "is settled
as far as this case is concerned." The case was decided in the appellate court solely on the
question of abandonment of the contract on the part of the plaintiff. Thus the Byington
case does not seem to be authority for the decision in the Taggart case.
The decision respecting the marriage clause in the Taggart case appears directly to
conflict with the holding of the Springfield Court of Appeals in the case of Blodgett v. Con3
solidated School Dist. No. 35 of Scott County. In this latter case, the court permitted the
"marriage clause" to stand, and Plaintiff was not permitted to recover because of her breach
of the clause.
Inasmuch as the court in Taggart v. School District gives no reason for holding the
marriage clause to be "arbitrary, unreasonable, and void", it is difficult to discuss the
9. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U. S. 412 (1920); Air-Way Electric Appliance Corporation v. Day, 266 U. S. 71
(1924); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S.
230 (1926); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1928); Liggett Co. v.
Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933).
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1. 88 S. W. (2d) 447 (Mo. App. 1935).
2. 224 Mo. App. 541, 30 S. W. (2d) 621
(1930).
3. 86 S. W. (2d) 374 (Mo. App. 1935).
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merits of the decision. The probable basis for the holding is the often stated doctrine that
contracts and conditions in restraint of marriage are void.4 Professor Williston says, "As the
sanctity of the marriage relation is at the foundation of the welfare of the State, the law has
looked with jealous regard at contracts concerning the relation." 5 This "jealous regard"
seemingly began during the reign of Augustus after the passage of the Lex lulia and the Lex
Pappia Poppaea.6 The two laws were passed to encourage marriage, and the natural result
was that agreements in restraint of marriage were invalid. Lord Chancellor Loughborough
in the case of Pearcev. Loman 7 says, "In the civil law, all conditions upon marriage, without
reasoning upon the effect or nature of them, were contrary to a positive law made in encouragement of marriage, upon the peculiar circumstances of the Roman World at that time,
antecedent to the two laws .. " Later writers disagree with Loughborough as to the exact
reason for the rule in the Roman law, 8 but in any event it did exist, and was followed by the
Ecclesiastical courts. 9 From the Ecclesiastical courts, the rule came into the common law.
In Harvey v. Aston, 10 the court says, "The true reason [for holding such a condition void I ...
seems to be ...to keep an uniformity between this court and the Ecclesiastical Court; for
since pecuniary legacies may be sued for in the Ecclesiastical Court where such a condition
[in restraint of marriagel would be holden void, it would be strange that the legatee suing
in the Ecclesiastical Court should recover his legacy, but suing here should be barred."
Since the doctrine has come into the common law, it has been modified to some extent,
contracts and conditions are not void if
so that the rule now generally followed is that such
the restraint upon marriage is a reasonable one. n The elements which go to make up this
reasonableness are not very clearly defined by the courts. Some say that if the restraint
is not the chief purpose of the contract, it is reasonable.u Others hold that if marriage is
13
inimical to the employment contracted for, the restraint of marriage is not unreasonable.
Viewing all of the circumstances of the teacher's contract, the doctrine of the Taggart
case appears to be an unsound one. The restraint in that case was not the chief purpose
of the contract, but rather was only incidental to the contract of employment. The fact that
marriage brings with it the duty of caring for the home and14the possibility of pregnancy
argues that marriage is inimical to the profession of teaching. The restraint was only for
one year, and it is difficult to conceive why it should be considered unreasonable.
The opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals in the Blodgett case appears to be a more
liberal and sounder view. A strict adherence to the old doctrine is not an absolute necessity;
and the clause in question in the Taggart case does not seem to be unreasonable in the light
of the circumstances of the case. If it is still felt that such clauses are not socially desirable,
the better way to eliminate them would be by means of a statute rather than by an unreasonable interpretation of the "public policy" which such clauses are supposed to affect.
Another point to be observed is that made by the lower court in the Byington case.
That court held that § 11137 of the 1919 Revised Statutes of Missouri limited the power of
the school board in respect to what might be included in the teacher's contract; and that
the school board could not, by its contract with the teacher, enlarge its authority or power
to make rules and regulations. Thus, the court holds, that under that statute the school
board was not empowered to put the marriage clause in the contract. The statute does state
what elements must be included in the contract, but does not expressly limit the provisions
of the contract to those elements. A more liberal interpretation of that statute would be
that the school board could add any reasonable provisions in the teacher's contract which it
felt were necessary. Such an interpretation would permit the inclusion of the marriage
4. 3
§ 1741.

WiLLIsToN,

CONTRACTS

(1920)

11.

5.

Ibid.

6.

MOmMSEN, R6MISCHES STAATSRECHT
BOCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN

376ff;

10, 291.
7. 3 Ves. 138 (1796).
8. (1914) 49 L. R. A.
9. 3 Ves. 138 (1796).

2 Comyns 726 (1740).
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4;
(1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. s.) 633.
143, 118
12. Fletcher v. Osborn, 282 Ill.
N. E. 446 (1918).
13. Williston, op. cit. supra note 4.
14. Backie v. Cromwell Consolidated
School District, 186 Minn. 38, 242 N. W.
389 (1932).
10.

LAW

(N. s.)

606.
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clause, if, of course, we regard the marriage clause as a reasonable one. The Taggart case
has been certified to the Supreme Court, and it is possible that the decision of that body will
rest upon the judicial interpretation of the above mentioned statute
KIRK JEFFREY
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT OF FORMER TESTIMONY.

State v. Pierson'
At the second trial of the case of State v. Pierson,the plaintiff read in evidence the testimony of a witness given at a former trial, the witness then being incompetent to testify by
reason of insanity. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that it was error to exclude evidence
offered by the defendant for the purpose of impeaching the credibility and weight of the former testimony, such evidence being designed to show that, unknown to the defendant, such
witness had been suffering from the same disease, dementia praecox, at the time of the first
trial.
By this decision the court seems to be logically extending the general rule stated by
2
Wigmore, namely, that "the existence of a derangement of the sort termed insanity is
admissible to discredit, provided that it affected the witness.., while on the stand"; but no
decision has been found in which former testimony was thus sought to be impeached.
3
In Blanchard v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a witness who was
absent and whose testimony on a former trial was read to the jury could not be impeached
by proof that he was of a low order of intelligence, where it was not claimed that he was
insane. This evidence was not excluded on the ground that former testimony cannot be
impeached by showing that the witness was mentally incompetent to testify at the time of
the former trial. The court merely applied the general rule that no witness can be impeached
4
by showing that he is not possessed of ordinary powers of mind. The court said: "It should
be borne in mind that no question of insanity, or of a mind diseased or weakened by liquor
or drugs, is here presented or decided".
As to impeachment of former testimony in other ways, a good many cases are to be
found where it was sought to impeach such testimony by evidence of statements contradicting those made at the earlier trial. The majority rule seems to be that such impeaching evidence cannot properly be introduced, regardless of whether the contradictory statements
were made prior or subsequently to the testimony at the earlier trial, unless the proper
5
foundation has been laid by a warning question. That is, the witness must be asked while
on the stand, whether he made such contradictory statements in order that he may deny so
doing, or explain the statements if he admits having made them; his attention must be
called to the time, manner and place of making the statements. In the case of former testimony the warning question cannot be asked because at the time of the second or later trial
the witness is not on the stand, and most courts refuse to dispense with this requirement. No
Missouri case has been found in which former testimony was thus sought to be impeached.
However, in an analogous situation, where under Mo. Rev. Stat. (1899) § 678,6 an affidavit
for continuance embodying the particular facts expressed to be proven by a witness, may
under certain circumstances be introduced as the testimony of such witness on account of his
absence, the statute providing further that the opposite party may prove any contradictory
statements made by the witness in relation to the matter in issue, the Missouri courts have
held that such contradictory statements are admissible though no foundation for the im7
peachment of the absent witness can be laid by asking a warning question. It has also been
1.

85S. W. (2d) 48 (Mo. 1935).

2.

2

WIOMORE, EVIDENCE

(2d ed. 1923)

§ 932.
3. 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922).
4. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 935; Bell v. Rinner, 16 Oh. St. 46 (1864),a
leading case on this point.
5. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S.
237 (1895); Hubbard v. Briggs, 31 N. Y. 536
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(1865); Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boesen, 75
Neb. 767, 105 N. W. 303 (1905). Contra:
Mitchell v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. Rep. 530,
222S. W. 983 (1920).
6. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 940.
7. Ely-Walker Dry Goods Co. v.
Mansur, 87 Mo. App. 105 (1901); Nagel v.
Transit Co., 104 Mo. App. 438,79 S. W. 502
(1904).
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held that a party opposing the probate of a will may impeach "constructive testimony"
of an absent attesting witness by showing the witness' contradictory statements. 8
On the other hand, it has been held that a party cannot impeach testimony in the
deposition of a witness by proving contradictory statements, without first having called the
witness' attention to such statements by a warning question. 9
Investigation of Missouri cases fails to show any case where a party attempted to impeach the testimony of a witness in a deposition by showing that the witness was in a defective mental condition at the time the deposition was taken. The Texas courts have held
that such evidence is admissible, the witness' mental capacity being material to enable the
jury properly to weigh his testimony. 10
HELEN HUNKER

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-JURISDICTION TO GRANT LETTERS-CONFLICTING
JUDICATION OF DOMICILE.
In re Grenning's Estate1

AD-

Section 4 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1929) provides that "letters testamentary
or of administration shall be granted in the county in which the mansion house or place of
abode of the deceased is situated." Testator died on December 17, 1932, having executed
his will several years before in the state of Oklahoma. Later in December this will was filed
in the probate court of Ralls County, and on the same day, a commission was ordered to
issue for the taking of the testimony of the attesting witnesses to the will in Oklahoma. On
January 23, 1933, defendant, not knowing of the will, or of the proceedings commenced in
Ralls County, applied for appointment as administratrix of testator's estate at the probate
court of Monroe County, alleging that the testator was a resident of Monroe County. On the
same day the court appointed defendant administratrix as prayed. On February 11, 1933,
the probate court of Ralls County found that the testator was a resident of Ralls County and
ordered that the will be admitted to probate, and on March 6, 1933, appointed plaintiff
executor. Several days later plaintiff filed this motion in the probate court of Monroe County
praying that this court revoke and set aside all proceedings theretofore had by it concerning
the administration of the estate and the appointment of the defendant as administratrix.
From an order revoking her letters of administration, dLfendant appealed to the circuit
court, and from its judgment sustaining plaintiff's motion, defendant again appeals. Affirmed.
In holding that the finding of a probate court as to the existence of a fact upon which
its jurisdiction over a particular matter depends is not subject to collateral attack, this
case is in accord with the previous Missouri cases involving this question, 2 and with the
weight of authority.3 Missouri seemingly extends this principle to apply as between states
as well as between counties, 4 though the prevailing view on the latter point is to the contrary."

8. German Evangelical Bethel Church of
Concordia v. Reith, 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S. W.
(2d) 1057 (1931).
9. Able v. Shields, 7 Mo. 123 (1841);
Gregory v. Cheatham, 36 Mo. 161 (1865);
Ebert v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 174
Mo. App. 45, 160 S. W. 34 (1913).
10. Kellner v. Randle, 165 S. W. 509
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914); McClure v. Fall, 43
S. W. (2d) 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
1. 89 S. W. (2d) 123 (Mo. App. 1936).
2. In re Duly's Estate, 27 Mo. 43 (1858);
Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 (1887);
In re Estate of Davison, 100 Mo. App. 263,
73 S. W. 373 (1902); Linder v. Burns,

243 S. W. 361 (Mo. 1922); Wyatt, Adm'r v.
Wilhite, 192 Mo. App. 551, 183 S. W. 1101
(1916).
3. In re Kladivo's Estate, 188 Iowa 471,
176 N. W. 262 (1920); Bremer v. Lake Erie
& W. R. Co., 318 I11. 11, 148 N. E. 862
(1925); Bolton v. Schriever, 135 N. Y. 65,
31 N. E. 1001 (1892); Holmes v. Warton,
194 N. C. 470, 140 S. E. 93 (1927); Sewell v.
Christison, County Judge, 114 Okla. 177,
245 Pac. 632 (1926).
4. Citizen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore,
215 Mo. App. 21, 263 S. W. 530 (1924).
5. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. 242
U. S. 394 (1917); Colvin v. Jones, 194 Mich.
670, 161 N. W. 847 (1917).
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The courts of a few states, including Kansas, hold that the finding of a probate court that
the testator was a resident of its county may be collaterally attacked, even in courts of concurrent jurisdiction. 6 It seems obvious that the consequences of such a rule are chaotic. If
this position is taken each probate court in the state could appoint a personal representative
by finding that the testator was a resident of its county, and there would be nothing to prevent every representative appointed from recovering for the same debt from a debtor of
the testator, as a judgment for one would not be a bar to a recovery by another.
When holding that a decision of a probate court respecting the residence of a testator
is not open to collateral attack, it is generally not difficult to decide which of the courts purporting to decide this question may retain its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others,
because in the ordinary case the court in which proceedings are first commenced becomes
the first to decide the question of residence. When, however, as in the principal case, the
court in which proceedings were first started is not the first to decide this question, the
necessity of determining which court shall prevail then becomes a serious problem. It is
provided by statute7 in this state that "if, after letters of administration are granted, a will
of the deceased be found, and probate thereof be granted, the letters shall be revoked, and
letters testamentary or of administration with will annexed shall be granted." It is apparent
that such revocation does not deprive the court of any jurisdiction it may have acquired.
Furthermore, it is proper for a probate court to revoke letters granted by it when it is made
to appear that jurisdiction belongs to a court in another county. 8 The question as to which
court has jurisdiction still remains. This case holds, apparently without precedent, that
when the court in which proceedings were first commenced makes an order appointing an
administrator or executor, such order relates back to the inception of the proceedings begun
in that court, and thus it may retain its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other tribunals.
Some cases reach the same result, but base it upon the theory that the court in which the
first petition was filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction upon such filing and that this jurisdiction is never relinquished. 9 The better view would seem to be that no exclusive jurisdiction
is acquired until the court decides that the facts necessary for the proper assumption of
jurisdiction exist and thereupon gives its order of appointment.10
It has been held in actions in personam, where either of two or more courts may have
jurisdiction, and in those actions in rem where it is assumed or unquestioned that the facts
necessary for the acquisition of jurisdiction exist, that jurisdiction may be deemed to have
attached when the petition was filed or process served.U Consequently in these cases the

court thus acquiring jurisdiction is entitled to retain it,2 and prohibition will be granted to
prevent other courts from interfering with this jurisdiction13 But even in these cases, when
a judicial order or judgment is given, it becomes binding and conclusive on all other courts,
regardless of which action was first commenced.14 In any event such cases should have no
6. Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 70
Pac. 369 (1902); Dresser v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 101 Kan. 401, 168 Pac. 672 (1917).
7. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 40.
8. Power v. Green, 139 Ga. 64, 76 S. E.
567 (1912); 23 C. J. 1101.
9. Stewart v. Poinbeouf, 111 Tex. 299,
233 S. W. 1095 (1921); Hanson v. Nygard,
105 Minn. 30, 117 N. W. 235 (1908). The
case of State ex rel. Mitchell v. Gideon, 215
Mo. App. 46, 137 S. W. 220 (1928), appears
to support this view, though it is distinguishable in the respect that it contains a
strong suggestion of fraud in the procuring
of the will from the first court in which it
was filed in order to probate it in the other
court.

10. Tilton v. O'Conner, 68 N. H. 215,
44 Atl. 303 (1895); see also Phoenix Bridge
Co. v. Castleberry, 131 F. 175 (C. C. A. 4th,
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1904); Long v. Burnett, 13 Iowa 28 (1862);
Jackson v. Handy, 166 Okla. 13, 25 Pac.
(2d) 771 (1933).
11. State ex rel. Tauban v. Davis, 190
S. W. 964 (Mo. App. 1916); Julian v. Commercial Assur. Co., 220 Mo. App. 115, 279
S. W. 740 (1926); In re Couch Cotton Mills
Co., 275 Fed. 496 (N. D. Ga. 1921); Graig v.
Hoge, 95 Va. 275, 28 S. E. 317 (1897).
12. Julian v. Commercial Assur. Co.,
220 Mo. App. 115, 279 S. W. 740 (1926);
Cromwell v. Hamilton, 87 Okla. 66, 209
Pac. 395 (1922); 15 C. J. 1134.
13. State ex rel. Tauban v. Davis, 190
S. W. 964 (Mo. App. 1916); State ex rel.
Sullivan v. Reynolds, 209 Mo. 161, 107 S. W.
487 (1907); Lee v. Superior Courtof California, 191 Cal. 46, 214 Pac. 972 (1923);
State v. District Court of Tulson County, 82
Okla. 54, 198 Pac. 480 (1921).
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application to the type of case under discussion, since here a jurisdictional fact must be
found to exist before itcan be determined which court is the proper one to assumejurisdiction,
and since, it being a proceeding in rem, only one court can truly be said to have jurisdiction.
The unsoundness of the theory that jurisdiction attaches upon the filing of the petition is
apparent if the court in which the first petition is filed subsequently decides that it has no

jurisdiction. Moreover, as a legal fiction should only be used to prevent injustice,S it is
difficult to see how the application of the fiction of relation back here can be said to be
justified. On the other hand, the desirability of the actual administration of the estate
being commenced at the earliest possible date would ordinarily be reached by allowing the
first court to grant letters to prevail.
SEsco V. TIPTON

INCORPORATED SOCIETY-NATURE OF MEMBERSHIP IN.

State ex rel Baumhoff v. Taxpayer's League of St. Louis'
This was a petition for a writ of mandamus for the reinstatement of relator into membership in the Taxpayer's League from which he had been excluded without a hearing. The
facts of the case may be briefly stated. The relator was a member of the Taxpayer's League
since its incorporation in 1925, and in 1931 he wished to examine the books of the corporation in order to prepare a defense to a slander suit that had been brought against him by the
secretary-treasurer of the League. To prevent the relator from exercising his corporate right
of examination, a resolution was passed, excluding him from the League and thereby depriving him of this right. The court observed that "obviously, the purpose and effect of the
resolution . . . was to exclude from membership all persons not on the list of members
approved by the meeting as constituting the list of members in good standing .. ." The
3
possibility of resignation of the relator is unimportant to the discussion of the case. The
Taxpayer's League of St. Louis County was organized under Art. 10, c. 32 of Rev. Stat. of
Missouri (1929), providing for the incorporation of benevolent, religious, scientific, fraternalbeneficial and educational associations not organized for profit. Its purpose was to promulgate better government for St. Louis County. The writ was denied by the St. Louis Court of
Appeals on the theory that it had no jurisdiction, because relator had no proprietary or
pecuniary interest to be protected.
The problems of protecting rights when no such interest appears is presented to courts
of law when extraordinary legal remedies are sought and to courts of equity when injunctive
relief is sought. It is acknowledged in the principal case that the relator seeks to protect an
intangible interest that is neither proprietary nor pecuniary in nature. A close analogy to the
situation is found in the protection of so-called rights of personality. In these cases the courts
were at first inclined to refuse relief because no property interest was presented for their
protection. The writer concedes that the relator had no tangible property interest to be
protected in the case under discussion, but it is submitted that he had a right of some sort

14. Nave v. Adams, 107 Mo. 414, 17
S. W. 958 (1891); Drake v. Kansas City
Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App. 365, 41
S. W. (2d) 1066, rehearingdenied, 54 S. W.
(2d) 427; United States v. Dewey, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,956 (1876); Boatman's Bank
of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650 (C. C. A.
8th, 1905); Sims v. Miller, 151 Ark. 377,
236 S. W. 828 (1921); Paskewie v. East
St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 197 Ill. App. 1
(1915); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, (5th ed.
1925) § 719; 34 C. J., 758 (1924).
15. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, 199 U. S. 1895 (1905); Stearns
Fiction (1932) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 1, 7.

1. 87 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo. App. 1935).
2. Id. at 208.
3. Ibid. "Relator, on motion for rehearing, presents a number of excerpts from
the testimony going to show that he never
resigned as a member of the Taxpayer's
League. The opinion concedes that on that
issue the evidence was conflicting. This
case, however, does not rule on that issue,
but on the resolution adopted at the meeting of September 26th, which unquestionably excluded the relator from membership.
Cases cited by relator, wherein were involved direct or severable pecuniary or
proprietary rights or interests in point."
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that ought to have been protected, whether it is to be called an interest of substance or what
not. The court held, however, that since there was no property right to be protected in
relator's petition for reinstatement into membership for the purpose stated, it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. 4
Equitable and legal jurisdiction has been extended beyond the protection of tangible
property rights in a great many cases. The extension of jurisdiction for the protection of
human dignity and peace of mind has been made much easier through the ever-widening
meaning attached to the conception of property. The gulf between an acre of land and the
right of privacy may have been too broad for equity to cover both, but its jurisdiction over
"property," as the courts choose to define it, has allowed the protection of rights that are
certainly not "severable proprietary or pecuniary interests." ' , Although the courts have
extended the concept of "property" to include a great many interests and privileges, yet the
court refused in the principal case even to consider the value of the intangible right of participation in the association by the relator. If the court had wished to follow the fiction of
requiring a prerequisite of a "property interest" before it would entertain the case, it could
have easily called this privilege of participation "property" and then gone into the question of whether it was of enough value to protect. The writer readily concedes that all
rights of members of every sort of organization should not necessarily be protected. However, there might well be an injury in some of the cases involving membership in clubs,
associations, or leagues, that is akin to a violation of privacy, and which, therefore, might
be a grave injury without involving any interest of "property" at all. The fear that Sir
George Jessel expresses 6 that equity would undertake an impossible task if it sought to protect against such injuries will be dealt with a little later.
Turning now to the three cases cited by the court to sustain its decision we find little
authority for its broad proposition of denial of jurisdiction. In State ex rel Hyde v. Jackson
4. Ibid. The complete holding of the
court was-"Whether or not the action
of the League in this excluding from membership, without a hearing, was wrongful
or unauthorized is a matter not within purview of judicial concern, since no direct or
severable pecuniary or proprietary right or
interest is involved."
5. Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to .Personalty (1915)
29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 668-877; Chaffee,
Equitable Relief Against Torts (1920) 34
HARv. L. REv. 388, 389; note (1936) 36 CoL.
L. Rav. 502; note (1936) 34 MxcH. L. REv.
588. Public nuisances are remotely connected with property rights and equity
takes jurisdiction. Equity has long protected
state-recognized "mental property" such as
patent, copyrights, and trademarks. Trade
secrets, unpublished poems, and private
letters are even protected. Gee v. Pritchard,
2 Swan. 402 (1818). Drake v. Drake, 177
N. W. 624 (Minn. 1920) (wife enjoined from
nagging her husband); Stock v. Hamilton,
149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919) (father
enjoined from associating and communicating with his daughter); Ex Parte Warefield, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933
(1899) (defendant enjoined from associating
with wife who alienated the wife's affection).
The case of Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App.
652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911), recognized the
right of privacy as a property interest when
it allowed action for damages because of

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol1/iss2/6

the unauthorized publication of the picture
of five-year old son of plaintiff.
6. Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880).
"There is no such jurisdiction that I am
aware of reposed, in this country at least, in
any of the Queen's courts to decide upon the
rights of persons to associate together when
the association possesses no property. Persons, and many persons, do associate together without any property in common at
all. A dozen people may agree to meet and
play bridge at each other's house for a certain period, and if eleven of them refuse to
associate with the twelfth any longer, I am
not aware that there is any jurisdiction in
any court of justice in this country to interfere. Or a dozen or-a hundred scientific men
may agree with each other in the same way
to meet alternately at each other's houses,
or at any place there is a possibility of their
meeting each other; but if the association
L]as no property, and takes no subscriptions
from its members, I cannot imagine that any
court ofjustice would interfere with such an
association if some of the members declined
to associate with some of the others." Note
however, that England has modified the
effect of this decision.
See Osborne v.
Amalgamated Society of Railroad Servants,
104 L. T. 2728 (1911) 1 Ch. 562, where the
decision was expressly qualified as going too
far. See, also D'Arcy v. Adamson, 57 S.J.
391; 29 T. L. R. 367.
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County MedicalSociety, 7 the court refused to reinstate a doctor who had been excluded from
a medical society because he had written an obscene letter to one of the members of the
Library Club of the society after his application for membership in this club had been refused.
The court laid down the rule that before mandamus would be issued, a property, or pecuniary
right would have to be infringed. In State v. Landwehr,8 the point of jurisdiction was not
directly involved. The members of a lodge attempted to enjoin an order of the Grand
Chancellor that suspended plaintiff from membership. There was no contention on the
part of the plaintiffs that the Grand Chancellor had not acted within the scope of his authority. The court simply declined to interfere with internal affairs of the corporation. In Hall
v. Morrin,9 again the problem of jurisdiction was not involved. The court declined only to
interfere with internal affairs of the organization after it had decided that the trial for suspension of the member was in accord with the constitutional provisions of the articles of
associations. 10 It is difficult to see how the case can be cited as authority for the proposition
that it is not in the judicial purview of the court to inquire into the question of expulsion
without a hearing except when there is a property right involved.
It is submitted that the court was wrong in its decision in the principal case, and that
other decisions of that same court support the writer's view. In the case of Albers v. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis," this court approved the theory that equity's jurisdiction
depended upon inadequacy of legal remedy rather than the existence of any severable
proprietary interest. In this case, the plaintiff sought reinstatement in the Merchants'
Exchange by applying for an injunction prohibiting the directors from suspending him
because of nonpayment of a fine imposed upon him for smoking in the building. This is the
first Missouri case to pass directly on the point of law involved in the instant case. The
court said: "'The remedy by writ of injunction or prohibition shall exist in all cases where
an injury to real or personal property is threatened, and to prevent the doing of any legalwrong
whatever, whenever, in the opinion of the court, an adequate remedy cannot be afforded by an

actionfor damages, R. S.1899, Sec. 2722....' It is shown by the testimony of the plaintiff
that he is a commission merchant, doing business in volume varying from ten to twenty
millions a year, and the privilege of meeting other merchants on the floor of the exchange to
trade with them is a very valuable privilege. It is obvious, upon slightest reflection, that the
rules of the law in regard to the measure of damages afford no standard by which the loss
which might flow from even a temporary deprivation of this right could be estimated."' u
It is to be noted that courts of another jurisdiction have held that equity has no jurisdiction
on the same facts found in the Albers case.u
The writer does not urge the proposition that the court of equity should listen to all
disputes of all organizations at any time and the Missouri courts have seen fit to lay down
certain prerequisites that an excluded member must comply with before he is entitled to a
judicial review. The relator must exhaust all remedies within the corporation or the unincorporated society before he may be able to ask the court's aid. 4 The writer does not suggest
7. 295 Mo. 144, 243 S. W. 341 (1922).
8. 261 S. W. 241 (Mo. App. 1924).
9. 293 S. W. 435 (Mo. App. 1927).
10. The court said: "There are many
instances that occur to us in which the
members of the tribunal, before which the
hearing is had, are either directly or indirectly affected by the offenses alleged to have
been committed. Courts cite and try persons
for contempt. Directors of boards of trade
and stock exchanges try members for
offenses which have injured the very directors sitting in judgment, and similar
practice is to be found in the cases of police
boards, medical societies, bar associations,
clubs and other social organizations. We
conclude therefore that, inasmuch as the
manner of plaintiff's trial was governed by

the contract existing between him and the

International Association, and inasmuch as
the hearing appears to have been conducted
in substantial conformity with the laws
and rules of practice provided in the constitution by which he agreed to be bound,
his objection to the validity of his trial and
conviction are not well taken."
11. 39 Mo. App. 583 (1890).
12. Id. at 589 (Italics the writer's).
13. Fisher v. Board of Trade, 80 Il1.
85 (1875).

14. Mulroy v. Knights of Honor, 28
Mo. App. 463 (1888). See also Dawkins v.
Antrobus, 17 Ch. 615, 630 (1881); Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. D. 346,
353 (1879); Fisher v. Keane, 11 Ch. D. 353
(1878); Sperry's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 391
(1887).
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that cases involving membership in the Wednesday Club or the Saturday Night Bridge
Club should not be heard by the courts unless very special circumstances are found, but
such cases should not be dismissed with a statement of a supposed rule of law that excludes
from the court's jurisdiction all associations that do not happen to have some "severable
pecuniary or proprietary interests."
Again in 1901, this court, in the case of Brandenburgerv.Jefferson Club Association,15
expressed the view here urged. This case seems to have escaped the notice of the court entirely. A club was organized and incorporated for the purpose of preserving, defending, and
advancing the essential principle of pure government as formulated by Thomas Jefferson
and embodied in the history of the Democratic Party. Quoting from the opinion, "There
are rights and privileges incident to membership in an organization like the respondent club,
independent of any property interest which, if not valuable, are prized as desirable, and the
esteem in which they are held is likely to wax instead of wane, because the trend of society
bids fair to continue toward association habits and efforts....
The law has not lingered;
along with the phase of contemporary life has gone a development of rules needed to appropriately regulate these corporations, which have characteristics of their own and call for
an application of legal principles unlike that made to companies createdfor gainfulpurposes."
The court goes on to say: "It may be said, generally, that the disciplinary power of a corporation of the class to which the Jefferson Club belongs, over its members, and its rights to
try, suspend and expel them for alleged delinquencies, is not interfered with by the courts
except when abused. If a fair mode of trial is provided, with due notice to the accused, an
opportunity to defend himself and a decision rendered in goodfaith, notfrom caprice or ill will,
the civil courts wil not supercede it."'u
It is to be noted that the interest protected in the .dlberscase was valuable. It was not
tangible property in any sense of the word. The Brandenburger case could possibly be
distinguished on the ground that relief was denied the relator but it is to be noted that the
court first inquired into whether the relator had been excluded according to the laws of the
club and deciding that he had been then refused to go further. The narrow holding does not
decide that the relator's "privilege" would have been of sufficient value to be protected but
their dictum points clearly to the existence of some interest within the cognizance of legal
protection.
The Albers and the Brandenburger cases, thus, do not require a proprietary interest.
True, the right of the relator in the principal case was intangible, but the courts have protected intangible rights.17 If the definition of property must be extended until the courts
clearly recognize that a legal fiction is being employed to protect rights other than proprietaryinterests thewriter feels that the extension should have been made in the principal case.
The better view would be clearly to recognize the factual situation and acknowledge that
there is a right, a privilege of membership in a voluntary association, wholly disconnected
from any proprietary interest and then inquire into the justification of legally protecting
such an interest, requiring always the compliance with the rule of exhaustion of remedies
within the corporation before the court entertains the plea that the corporation has wrongfully excluded him.
In the principal case the court refused even to go into the question of the hearing the
relator received, in fact held the fact to be immaterial. The relator is left then without any
remedy at all to protect his rights and privileges that are incident to membership in the
League. The Brandenburger case seems to be the best decision rendered by the St. Louis
Courts of Appeals on the same factual circumstances.
JOHN W.

15. 88 Mo. App. 148 (1901).
16. Id. at 158. (Italics the writer's),
The statute this quotation refers to is the
statute that permits the pro forma decree
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corporations to adopt by-laws for expulsion
of members. The same provision is found
today in Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5005.
17. Supra, note 5.
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INsURANCE-LIABILITY OF INSURER TO INSURED FOR REFUSAL TO SETTLE.
1
McCombs v. Fidelity

and Casualty Co. of New York
The action was for damages arising out of a liability insurance policy issued by defendant, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, to plaintiff, R. M. McCombs. By this
policy the defendant company agreed to insure the plaintiff in the sum of $5000 against
liability for damages imposed by law arising from bodily injury or death suffered by any
person or persons as a result of the operation of a certain automobile. By the terms of this
policy the insurer reserved the right to settle any claim or suit brought against the insured
and to conduct the defense to any such action, in the event the insured was sued. The insured was not to interfere in any negotiation or legal proceeding conducted by the insurer
on account of any claim arising out of his operation of the automobile specified.
While this policy was in force, the insured, by reason of his negligence in the operation
of his automobile, seriously injured George McClard. Prior to the trial of the McClard case,
the attorney for the insurance company in charge of the insured's defense, received a bona
fide offer of settlement of that action for $5000. This offer was rejected by the insurance
company. The attorney for the insurance company and for the insured knew beyond a
reasonable doubt that McClard under the facts of the case would recover a judgment far
in excess of $5000 against the insured. He regarded the case as a hopeless one for the defense
and accordingly advised the insurance company to settle the case for the limit of the liability
policy. This the company refused to do on the ground that it was not its policy to settle for
the maximum liability as there was an element of chance that McClard would not recover.
McClard recovered a judgment for $10,000 against the insured, who brings this action to
recover damages from the insurance company for its failure to settle for $5000 as offered by
McClard. The St. Louis Court of Appeals found that the evidence of bad faith in refusing
to settle was ample and affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff below.
This case presents a question of first impression in Missouri, but has been frequently
decided in other jurisdictions where similar policy provisions were involved. By the terms of
the policy the privilege of the insured to settle the claim was taken away,2 and such agreement is not void as a champertous contract; 3 but there is a duty on the insurer to act in good
faith and to act diligently in settling a claim or in defending any such action. 4 The intcrests
of the insurer and insured in defending the action are not opposed, but in deciding whether
or not to accept an offer of settlement their interests may be different. The liability of the
insured is unlimited, and a settlement for any amount not exceeding the sum named in the
policy is acceptable to him. The insurer, on the other hand, has a limited liability. It may be
to his advantage to refuse an offer of settlement if the amount asked closely approaches the
maximum liability under the policy. He may feel that there is a chance that the verdict
will not equal the maximum of his liability.
The courts agree that if failure to settle is in bad faith, the insurer is liable.5 Many courts
hold, furthermore, that negligence in not settling the claim is a basis for relief against the
insurer. 6 Some jurisdictions, although holding that bad faith makes the insurer liable, refuse
1. 89 S. W. (2d) 114 (Mo. App. 1935).
2. In General Accident Assur. Corp. v.
Louisville Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193
S. W. 1031 (1917), it was held that a provision prohibiting the insured from settling
any claim involving accident covered by
the policy would not prevent insured from
settling the amount in excess of that for
which the insured was liable.
3. Ibid.
4. Brassie v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622 (1914); Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. General Accident
Assur. Corp., 6 Ohio App. 344 (1917);
New York Cons. R. Co. V. Mass. Bonding
and Ins. Co., 193 App. Div. 438, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 243 (1920).
5. Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity and

Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081
(1916); Best Building Co. v. Employers
Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160
N. E. 911 (1928); Tiger River Pine Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 163 S. C. 229,
161 S. E. 491 (1931).
6. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort
Marine Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 1st,
1917); Douglas v. United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127
Atl. 708 (1924) (insurer held liable for
negligent failure to settle claim within the
limits of the policy); Slowers Furniture Co. v
American Indemnity Co. 15 S. W. (2d)
544 (Com. App. Tex. 1929) (insurer defending suit against the insured must exercise
ordinary care in considering offer of settlement).
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to extend the liability beyond the maximum named in the policy where the insurer is only
negligent. 7 Will the courts of Missouri extend this liability further and hold the insurer
liable for a negligent failure to settle? Many courts have accepted this view, but their reasoning is quite varied. Some say that the insurer is an agent of the insured; others say that
he is an independent contractor. Both of these views are subject to criticism. It must be
admitted after an analysis of the arguments employed to found a duty, that they are not
in the light of logic and precedent sufficient. Yet the courts have the power and the duty to
make new precedents, in order that present day needs may be satisfied. As said by Mr.
Justice Cardozo, "You may call this process legislation if you will. In any event no system ofjus scriptum has been able to escape the need of it."' It seems that the source of this
liability is the great desire for the courts to recognize "the position of guardianship occupied
by the insurer in society and to endow the insurer with a responsibility for efficient action
greater than is required by the corner grocer."
In the case of an insurance company's tort liability arising from an unreasonable delay
in acting on an application for insurance, some courts recognize the liability of the insurer,
but do not agree in their reasoning to support such liability.1 0 Because of an insurance
company's position in society there is some basis, perhaps, for this doctrine of tort liability
in these cases. Certainly if an insurance company is liable in damages for its unreasonable
delay in acting on an application for insurance, likewise, it should be liable for failure to
settle a claim under an indemnity policy, whether the insurance company acted in bad faith,
or was negligent.
SAM P.

KIMBRELL

NUISANCE-SPLITTING OF CAUSES AND SUMMARY OF MISSOURI

LAW AS

TO

CONTINUING

NUISANCE.
Kelly v. The City of Cape Girardeau"
Plaintiff's land was flooded by heavy rains because of street grades established by the
City of Cape Girardeau and because of an inadequate storm sewer. Plaintiff maintained
several actions at law for damages against the city and the condition was adjudicated a
continuing or temporary nuisance.
In 1931 plaintiff recovered, in one action, for damages resulting from several floods.
In 1932 plaintiff brought the present action to recover for damages caused by other floods
which occurred prior to the floods which were the basis of the 1931 action. 2 The Springfield
Court of Appeals held that the judgment in the 1931 action was not a bar to the present
action because each flood was a separate and distinct cause of action. However, the Court
of Appeals certified its decision to the Supreme Court because the judges considered the
decision to be in conflict with certain prior decisions.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was vigorously criticised in a note in the University
of Missouri Law Series' along the lines now adopted by the Supreme Court in reversing that
decision and holding that the judgment in the 1931 action was a bar to the present action
because of the policy against permitting a plaintiff to split a cause of action. It is submitted
that this result is highly desirable as protecting the courts as well as the defendant from the
burden of unnecessary litigation. It is in accord with several previous decisions in this state
7. Mendota Electric Co. v. New York
Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N. W.
61 (1928); Best Building Co. v. Employers
Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160
N. E. 911 (1928) (insurer held not liable for
more than amount of policy on ground of
negligence in failing to settle for less).
8.
CARDOZO,
THE NATURE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922) 15.
9. Comment (1930) 40 YALE

OF

(1912); Duffe v. Bankers Life Ass'n., 160
Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913). Contra:
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School
District, 122 Ark. 179, 182 S. W. 547 (1916);
American Life Ins. Co., v. Nabors, 124 Tex.
221, 76 S. W. (2d) 497 (1934); Lipscomb,
Court-Made Torts (1933) 3 IDAHO L. J. 12.

THE

L. J. 121;
Comment (1933) 13 B. U. L. REv. 734.
10. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual
Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 443, 121 Pac. 329
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(1934).
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in which the same considerations were involved, 4 and also in accord with the leading cases
from other j urisdictions.6
The present decision has settled the Missouri law as to this point. Since the Court,
obiter, approved certain Missouri decisions involving other problems in connection with
continuing or temporary nuisances, it is worth while to summarize the Missouri law in connection with such decisions:
I

II

III

Definition:
"A temporary nuisance, as distinguished from a permanent one, may be
said to be one which may be abated."
"Where ... the structure or character of the business, when properly conducted and operated, does not constitute a nuisance, but only becomes such
through negligence, then the nuisance or injury is only temporary or abateable."' 6
Relief may be obtained by:
A-Suit in equity for an injunction. 7
B-Action at law for damages.8
Considerations arising in actions at law:
A-Measure of damages:
1. Recovery may be had only for such damages as have accrued.
Probable future injuries may not be shown. 9
B-Pleading:
1. If the injuries are of an intermittent type each separate occurrence
must be declared on in a separate count.' 0
2. If the injury is of such nature as to be constantly operating, one
count is apparently sufficient. 1 '
C-Limitations:
1. The statute runs independently on each injury or item of damage.u
D-Splitting of causes:
1. All damages which have accrued prior to the filing of the petition
must be sued for, otherwise they are barred and cannot be the
basis of a subsequent action."

Cape Girardeau, Mo.

4. Steiglider v. The Missouri Pacific
Railway Co., 38 Mo. App. 511 (1889);
Kelly v. The City of Cape Girardeau, 227
Mo. App. 730, 60 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933);
Viviano v. Ferguson, 39 S. W. (2d) 568
(Mo. App. 1931).
5. Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen,
195 Ind. 106, 143 N. E. 596 (1924); Beckwith v. Griswold, 29 Barb. 291 (N. Y. 1859).
6. Shelly v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327
Mo. 238, 37 S. W. (2d) 518 (1931).
7. Sherlock v. Kansas City Belt Railway
Co., 142 Mo. 172, 43 S. W. 629 (1897).
Harrelson v. Kansas City and Atlantic
Railroad Co., 151 Mo. 482, 52 S. W. 368
(1899).
8. Kelly v. The City of Cape Girardeau,
228 Mo. App. 865, 72 S. W. (2d) 880 (1933).
9. This result is desirable because the
probable damages are difficult to estimate
and because the nuisance might be abated.

S. RUSSELL

VANDIVORT,

LL. B., '35

See Van Hoosier v. Hannibal and St. Joseph
Railroad Co., 70 Mo. 145 (1879); Shelly
v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37
S. W. (2d) 518 (1931).
10. Offield v. Wabash, St. Louis and
Pacific Railway Co., 22 Mo. App. 607(1886);
Bunten v. Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Railway Co., 50 Mo. App. 414
(1892).
11. Shelly v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327
Mo. 238, 37 S. W. (2d) 518 (1931).
12. Kelly v. The City of Cape Girardeau,
89 S. W. (2d) 41 (Mo. 1935).
13. Kelly v. The City of Cape Girardeau,
89 S.W. (2d)41 (Mo. 1935); Steiglider v. The
Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 38 Mo. App.
511 (1889); Kelly v. The City of Cape
Girardeau, 227 Mo. App. 730, 60 S. W. (2d)
84 (1933); Viviano v. Ferguson, 39 S. W.
(2d) 568 (Mo. App. 1931).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1936], Art. 6
RECENT CASES
PLEADING-COUNTERCLAIM-MUTUAL

LIBELS AS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION.

Skluzacsk s. Wilby'
To plaintiff's cause of action for libel contained in defendant's letter of July 19, 1934,
defendant filed a counterclaim based on an alleged libel published by the plaintiff in a
phamplet in June, 1934. Apparently there was a connection between the two publications
in that they were made with reference to a common controversy that had arisen between the
parties. Held that the counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff's
cause of action and, therefore, could not avail the defendant in this action.

of the
The statute defines and limits a counterclaim as "a cause of action arising out
action." 2
contract or transaction of plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the
3
slanders when they occured at the same time,
A counterclaim has been allowed for mutual
4
but most courts hold to the contrary. When the defendant counterclaims for assault in an
action for slander, both occuring at the same time, the majority of the courts refuse to allow
the counterclaim, though here there is a greater tendency to do so.6 In case of collisions
it is generally recognized that the defendant may counterclaim for the negligence of the
have any difficulty in allowing the defendant's counterplaintiff. 6 Also, the courts do not
7
held that the word "transaction" is broad
claim in case of mutual assaults, for it is generally
8
enough to include the entire physical encounter. There is, perhaps, better reason to allow a
counterclaim in the last two situations, because the court generally determines which

party has a cause of action.
Despite the efforts at generalization, the statutes have remained a matter for the specific
application to the facts of each particular case. The courts have, however, attempted to
base the limits of the transaction on a narrow interpretation of the wording of the statute,
and have disregarded its purpose, namely to promote trial convenience in the case of controversies between the same parties where there are common questions of law and fact. Clark
says the only test which can be consonant with the function of the counterclaim is whether
or not the particular claim, in the court's discretion, may be expediently tried with the
10
plaintiff's cause. 9 The word "transaction" should not be restricted to contractual relations,
and should be flexible enough to include all facts that a layman would naturally associate
with, or consider as being a part of, the course of dealings between the parties."
In a suit for conversion of sacks, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed a counterclaim
for a defect in quality of the goods which were shipped in the sacks.1 The court said that the
word "transaction" included all the facts and circumstances out of which the injury arose.
In an action for the value of the professional services of a physician, the defendant based his
but it was found that no such agreement
counterclaim on a contract to "heal and cure,"
3
existed and the counterclaim was disallowed. The court implied by way of dictum that if
the defendant has based his claim 14on the transaction clause of the statute, it would have
been allowed. In Becke v. Forsee, where the plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution for
causing his arrest on the charge of assault with intent to kill, and the defendant counterclaimed for injuries resulting from the assault, the court refused to allow the counterclaim
7. Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90
N. W. 1081 (1902); Pelton v. Powell, 96
The corresponding statute for Missouri Wis. 473, 71 N. W. 887 (1897); Deagan v.
will be found in Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § Weeks, 73 N. Y. Supp. 641 (1901). Contra:
Prosser v. Carroll, 68 N. Y. Supp. 542
777.
3. Powell v. Powell, 160 Wis. 504, 152 (1900).
8. Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90
N. W. 168 (1915).
4. Wrege v. Jones 13 N. D. 267, 100 N. W. 1081 (1902).
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 455.
9.
N. W. 705 (1904); Sheehan v. Pierce, 23
10. Ritchie v. Hayward, 71 Mo. 560
N. Y. Supp. 1119 (1893).
5. MacDougall v. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274 (1880).
11. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 452.
(1868). Contra: Mogle v. Black, 5 Ohio
12. Ritchie v. Hayward, 71 Mo. 560
C. C.R. 51 (1890).
6. Heigel v. Willis, 3 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1880).
13. Ruth v. McPherson, 150 Mo. App.
(1889). Contra: Simpkins v. Columbia &
694, 131 S.W. 474 (1910).
G. R. Co., 20 S. C. 258 (1882).
14. 199 S. W. 734 (Mo. App. 1917).
1. 263 N. W. 95 (Minn. 1935).

2.

Mason's MINN. STAT. (1927) § 9254.
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upon the ground that the matter which defendant injected into the cause did not arhe out
of the acts connected with the malicious prosecution.
In view of the holding in the Becke case, the Missouri courts would probably agree
with the decision in the principal case. What the courts would do in the case of mutual
slanders occuring on the same occasion is more doubtful. It may be suggested that both
cases present common questions of law and fact which may be said to arise out of the same
transaction without doing violence to the ordinary concept of the expression.
ALDEN A. STOCKARD
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PART PERFORMANcE-RENDITION
SHORT BY PROMISOR'S EARLY DEATH.
1

OF PERSONAL SERVICES CUT

Selle v. Selle

Pursuant to an oral promise by his uncle that the plaintiff would get certain realty
upon the death of the uncle, in consideration of the plaintiff's caring for him during his life,
the plaintiff took his uncle into his home and there nursed and cared for him for a period of
two weeks, at which time the uncle died, not having conveyed or devised the land to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance against the heirs of the uncle and
obtained a decree in his favor in the lower court. Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed
the decree and remanded the case, with directions to ascertain the value of the plaintiff's
services and to make the amount a lien upon the land. The court said that "our rule is that
although the contract is oral, if the contract has been fully performed by the party agreeing
to render the services so that a denial of specific performance would work a fraud on the party
who has fully performed, then the statute of frauds cannot be successfully invoked as a bar
to recovery. But, in ruling on such contracts, even though performed on one side, the subject of specific performance is always within the sound discretion of the chancellor, and such
relief will be granted or denied according to the facts." The court then points out three facts
in this case which defeat the plaintiff's action: (1) The services rendered by the plaintiff
can be easily compensated in money; (2) the services rendered were of such a short duration;
(3) the services were not, in their nature, disagreable nor arduous. The implication of the
opinion is that the fact that the services were rendered over only a short period of time makes
their value easily computable in money.
Although there is a conflict of authority, the majority of American jurisdictions follow
the view that the rendition of personal services is a sufficient part performance to take an
oral contract out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds and to render it enforceable in
equity. 2 Missouri, apparently, is with this majority.3 This equitable relief against the
estate of the deceased person is many times spoken of as specific performance of the contract
to make a will. Obviously a contract to make a will or to devise certain property is not one
which lends itself to a specific enforcement, in as much as if the will were made, it could
later be revoked during the testator's life. The most that the courts can do, after the death
of the promisor, is to require the heir or devisee of the land to convey the property in accordance with the decedent's promise-it is an action in the nature of specific performance
of the ancestor's obligation to devise, which is enforced against his heirs, who are not purchasers of the property for value and without notice.
1. 88 S. W. (2d) 877 (Mo. 1935).
2. Speck v. Dodson 178 Ark. 249, 11
S. W. (2d) 456 (1928); dordon v. Spellman,
145 Ga. 682, 89S. E. 749 (1916); Flannery v.
Woolerton, 329 Ill. 424, 160 N. E. 762
(1893); Bryson v. McShane, 48 W. Va. 126,
35 S. E. 848 (1900); Brinton v. Van Cott, 8
Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218 (1893); Denevan v.
Belter, 232 Mich. 664, 206 N. W. 500 (1925);
Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N. E.
415 (1901); 36 CYc. 673; 58 C. J. 1017;

25 R. C. L. 588; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466;
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 752; 69 A. L. R. 14.
3. Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870);
Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101 (1876);
Hiatt v. Williams, 72 Mo. 214 (1880);
Carney v. Carney, 8 S. W. 462 (Mo. 1888);
Hall v. Harris, 145 Mo. 636, 47 S. W. 506
(1898); also see, Ver Standig v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 62 S. W. (2d) 1095 (Mo.
App. 1933); Jones v. Jones, 63 S. W. (2d)
146 (Mo. 1933).
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Other courts, although recognizing the doctrine of part performance if possession is
taken, will not deny the operation of the Statute of Frauds where the acts relied upon to
constitute part performance are wholly acts of personal service. 4 A few courts refuse to
recognize the doctrine in its entirety, holding that only a strict compliance with the letter
of the statute will move the court to enforce the contract.5
Conceding, as does the principal case, that the Missouri court would in certain situations enforce an oral contract to devise land where the performance, either partial or full,
is the rendition of personal services, it appears, that if the services are cut unduly short by
the death of the promisor, then the promisee cannot enforce the contract. There are two
views, it seems, as to the effect of the brevity of services occasioned by the early death of the
promisor where the obligation is to care for the promisor until his death.
Some courts look to the extent of the undertaking by the promisee, rather than to the
actual duration of the services, to determine whether the promisee has made out a case which
entitles him to enforce the contract. 6 The contract is viewed as of the time of its inception,
and, if at that time, it was fair and equal on its face, and further, if the promisee has actually
entered upon the performance of the services, then the mere fact that the promisee stands
to gain due to the early death of the promisor does not render the contract unenforceable.
In Berg v. Moreau,7 the promisee and her husband lived with and cared for the deceased for
about eighteen months and the Missouri Supreme Court granted specific performance,
holding that the nature of the plaintiff's services were such that their value could not be
estimated in money, noting that "the jingle of the guineas of a mere dry money recompense
cannot cure the hurts of a broken contract relating to services such as performed in this
case". The court in that case also said that if the deceased had lived out his life expectancy
of four years the compensation agreed upon would have been only fair and that if he had
lived over his expectancy, the compensation would have been inadequate. In an Idaho case, 8
the services were performed over a period of only one month and relief was granted, the court
saying that subsequent events such as the early death of the promisor could not enter into
the fairness of the contract nor the adequacy of consideration in this class of contracts, as
there is present an element of uncertainty, so that the fairness of the contract and the adequacy of consideration must be determined as of the time when the contract is made. In a
Massachusetts case, 9 the promisee lived with and cared for the deceased over a period of
only thirty-eight hours. The court held that there was such part performance as to entitle
the promisee to enforce the contract, because at the time the contract was made, it could
not be foreseen which party would profit the most and that each assumed the loss or gain by
contingencies and each was willing to do so. In an Oregon case,' 0 the promisee and his wife
orally contracted with the decedent that in consideration of them living with and caring for
decedent for the remainder of his life, he would devise to them certain property. The
promisor met with an accidental death some four months later, and the Oregon court granted
specific performance of the contract against the devisees under the decedent's will, declaring
that "the uncertainty of the time during which the plaintiffs would continue performance
of the contract was naturally within the contemplation of the parties and they must be presumed to have contracted with reference thereto". The courts following this view, in order
to determine the fairness of the contract and the adequacy of consideration, take notice of
mortality tables and the physical condition of the promisor.i,
4. Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29
Ad. 15 (1893); Rodman v. Rodman, 112
Wis. 378, 88 N. W. 218 (1901); Dexter v.
Winslow, 254 Mass. 407, 150 N. E. 158
(1926); Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y.

Kan. 230, 120 Pac. 351 (1912); Howe v.
Watson; Brinton v. Van Cott; Bryson v.
McShane, all supra note 2. But see Hazelton
v. Reed, 46 Kan. 73, 26 Pac. 450 (1891).
7. 199 Mo. 416, 97 S. W. 901 (1906).

5. Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252,
92 S. W. 767 (1906); Coffey v. Humble, 154
Ky. 708, 159 S. W. 554 (1913).
6. Lathrop v. Marble, 12 S. D. 511, 81
N. W. 885 (1900); Bless v. Blizzard, 86

60N. E. 415 (1901).
10. Woods v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159
Pac. 1158 (1916).
11. Ibid. and Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo.
416,97 S.W. 901 (1906).

230, 135 N. E. 773 (1922); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) § 197; 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1920) § 494.
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247 Pac. 10 (1926).
9. Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30,
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Another view is that the short duration of the promisee's services makes the value of
those services capable of accurate estimation in a suit at law in quasi-contract, and thus the
promisee is not entitled to relief in equity. = This view is expressed in a Virginia case where
the promisee and his wife boarded and nursed the deceased, who was an invalid for a period
of three months. The court said that the services were rendered over such a comparatively
short time that they were compensable in money damages.13 The Missouri case of ickerton v.
Fly4 is said to support this view, but that case may be distinguished on the ground that
the promisee had not rendered services of a personal nature, but services of such a nature
that their value could be accurately estimated and compensated for in money damages even
though they had extended over a period of years rather than, as was the fact, over a period
of several days. The principal case, it appears, follows this latter view, holding that "more is
required to justify specific performance in cases like the one here than life expectancy and
that the contract was fair when made", and that that "something more" is that the services
must not be "capable of an approximately accurate estimate, and their value liquidated in
money, so that the promisee may be made substantially whole". The court then holds that
the short duration of the services and the fact that the services were neither arduous nor
disagreeable are additional factors to be considered, apparently on the basis that they make
the value of the services more easily and accurately estimable in money.
Accepting the view, as the Missouri court does, that the rendition of personal services
takes an oral contract to convey or devise land out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds,
and disregarding the historical, theoretical, and practical unsoundness,15 perhaps, of that
view, it is submitted that it is inconsistent to hold that the brevity of the personal services
due to the early death of the promisor affects the enforceability of the contract in equity, by
making the value of those services capable of accurate monetary estimate. What would the
court have held in the principal case if the promisor had lived for a period of, say, ten years,
and during all that time the promisee had cared for and nursed the promisor? The court
says that the services were neither disagreeable nor arduous. If we disregard the fact that
disagreeableness is probably not required, and hold that the services need only be of a personal nature, there is little doubt that in the case supposed the court would have held that
the services were disagreeable,
arduous, and not estimable in money damages. Such a case
was Sutton v. Hayden,16 where the promisee lived with and nursed the deceased, an invalid,
for fifteen years, and the Missouri court granted specific performance of the promise to
devise, because "the services are such that money cannot buy, a thousand nameless and
delicate services and attentions, incapable of being the subject of an explicit contract, which
money with all its peculiar potency, is powerless to purchase". Again in Gupton V.Gupton,7
this court held that the value of such services could not be accurately estimated at law, for
who "can say how much it is worth to meet and manfully bear the caprices of unreasoning
and fretful old age", and granted relief although the services extended over only a four year
period.
In the instant case the promisor was both aged and an invalid, and the fact is not disputed that he did not want to go to the hospital but desired to go to the plaintiff's home. At
least, the deceased himself thought that he would receive the sort of service, care and attention from the plaintiff, his nephew, that could not be obtained elsewhere. The language
of either the Hayden or Gupton cases could apply equally well to the case supposed above
Should the fact, then, that in the instant case the services were rendered for only two weeks
affect the result? If the value of the services cannot be accurately estimated over a p(riod
of years, then the value of those same services cannot be accurately estimated if rendered
for only two weeks, and thus specific performance should be granted. Or conversely, if the
12. Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St.
588, 144 N. E. 715 (1924); Semmes v.
Worthington, 38 Md. 298 (1873); Yager v.
Lyon, 337 Ill.
271, 169 N. E. 222 (1929);
Frizzell v. Frizzell, 149 Va. 815, 141 S.E.
868 (1928); Hazelton v. Reed, 46 Kan. 73,
26 Pac. 450 (1891).

13. Frizzell v. Frizzell, 149 Va. 815,
141 S.E. 868 (1928).
14. 99 Mo. App. 116,72 S.W. 706 (1903).
15. Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230,
135 N. E. 773 (1922); 33 HAzv. L. REv.
931.
16. 62 Mo. 101 (1876).
17. 47 Mo. 37 (1870).
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value of the services can be accurately estimated if rendered for only two weeks, then, just
as easily, by simple multiplication, it can be accurately estimated if performed for ten
years, and specific performance should be denied in both cases.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case, adopting as it did the finding of the
lower court that a contract in fact existed,"' should have looked only to the nature of the
services and upon discovering them to be of a personal nature, and finding the contract was
fair when entered into and had been fully performed by the promisee, should have upheld
the decree of the lower court granting specific performance. Perhaps, the result of this case
may be satisfactorily explained, when the true basis upon which the Missouri court takes an
oral contract to convey or devise land out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds and enforces it in equity, is examined. The principal case states the rule to be, that an oral contract
is taken out of the operation of the statute when to deny specific performance would work a
"fraud" on the party performing the services. Numerous Missouri cases have so stated the

rule, some calling it "equitable fraud". 19 It is obvious, however, that in this type of case
there is no fraud, but the court is allowing relief in equity because of hardship on the promisee

if relief is denied. The promisee must show that in performing the services he has placed
himself in such a position that if the Statute of Frauds is not disregarded it will amount to a
great hardship on him. So the court in the principal case is perhaps holding that where the
services have been rendered over such a short period of time, the plaintiff has not made out
a case of such hardship as will warrant the Statute of Frauds to be disregarded and the
0
contract enforced. No doubt such is the basis, for in Campbell v. McLaughlin" the Missouri
court had no hesitancy in granting specific performance of a written contract to devise
land in consideration of services to be rendered during the promisor's life, even though the
actual duration of the services was only seventeen days. Considering then what appears to
be the true, even if unmentioned, basis upon which the Missouri court takes an oral contract
from without the operation of the Statute of Frauds where the acts of performance relied
upon are personal services, the court probably reached a result in harmony with the other
Missouri cases involving the rendition of personal services in cases of this type.

A. D.

SAPPINOTON

TAXATION-ARBITRARY AND GROSSLY ExcEssIvE VALUATION OF PROPERTY-DuE PROCESS

Great No. Ry. v. Weeks

1

Plaintiff, an interstate railroad company, brought suit in the Federal District Court of
North Dakota to enjoin the collection of taxes levied for 1933 upon its railroad properties
in North Dakota. The State Board of Equalization in assessing plaintiff's property had
apportioned the system value to the State upon the basis of the average of the five following
factors: (1) miles of track, (2) physical property, (3) car and locomotive miles, (4) ton and
passenger miles, and (5) gross earnings. The system value for such apportionment was
determined by averaging the average market price of the stocks and bonds of plaintiff
company over a five year period and the average net income over a five year period, capitalized at 6%. For the 1933 assessment, the Board took the assessment determined as
outlined above for 1932, minus the value of a short stretch of track removed since 1932.
Plaintiff brought this suit, contending that the apportionment of system value to the State
operated to assess property outside North Dakota, and that even if the method of apportionment could not be condemned, the assessment was nevertheless arbitrary and excessive and
18. The court is not necessarily bound
by the finding of the lower court, and it
appears that the evidence of the existence
of the contract must be very strong. Russell
v. Sharp, 192 Mo. 270, 91 S. W. 134 (1905);
Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58, 86
S. W. 200 (1905); Walker v. Bohannon, 243
Mo. 119, 147 S. W. 1024 (1912).
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19. Farrar v. Patton, 20 Mo. 81 (1854);
Dickerson v. Chrisman, 28 Mo. 134 (1859);
Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo. App. 18 (1892);
Buxton v. Huff, 254 S. W. 79 (Mo. 1923);
cases cited supra note 3.
20. 205 S. W. 18 (Mo. 1918).
1.

-U.

S.-, 56 S. Ct. 426 (1936).
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in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The bill was2 dismissed
in the trial court and that judgment was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case
went to the United States Supreme Court on certiorari, and thejudgment was there reversed
by a court divided 6-3.3 This court took the view that while the method of apportionment
must be upheld, the valuation of the whole system was arbitrary and grossly excessive.
It held that the Board arbitrarily adopted the 1932 valuation based on stock and bond
values and net income, thereby disregarding the decline in value of all properties from 1932
to 1933 and producing a grossly excessive assessment in violation of due process. Overvaluation alone is not enough to warrant an injunction, nor is mere error ofjudgment enough,
it noted. "There must be something that in legal effect is the equivalent of intention or
fraudulent purpose to overvalue the property and so set at naught fundamental principles
that safeguard the taxpayer's rights ....-4 The validity of the assessment must be tested
upon consideration of facts established by the evidence and those of which judicial notice
will be taken. The evidence-shows that if the valuation for 1933 had been determined by the
same method as the valuation for 1932, it would have been $15,000,000 less than the 1932
valuation. The Court takes judicial notice of "the depression" beginning in 1929 and becoming by 1933 more than a temporary condition. The Board's failure to take into consideration this enormous diminution in value from 1932 to 1933 is in the opinion of the Court
the equivalent in law of intention to make a grossly excessive assessment for 1933 in violation of due process. The Court observed that it need not consider whether the assessment
was repugnant to the equal protection clause or the commerce clause of the Constitution.
In a strong dissent, Justice Stone pointed out that the decision of the majority of the
court rests on the single ground that the valuation of plaintiff's property is excessive,without
any showing or contention that there was any discrimination in the valuation of plaintiff's
property as compared with that of other property in the State or that plaintiff was in any
way bearing an undue share of the tax burden imposed on all property owners in the State.
The doctrine seemingly announced by this decision is a novel one and a departure from
and so firmly established in the field of taxation as
principles long considered fundamental
5
to be beyond question at this date.
"It has long been recognized that discrimination between taxpayers, if intentional or so
" But the majority opinion
persistentas to be systematic, is a denial of equal protection ....
goes beyond this familiar principle and bottoms its decision not on the equal protection
clause but on the due process clause. It reasons, in effect: "The State law requires that all
property... be assessed at its true and full value in money.... The true and full value of the
property is the amount the owner would be entitled to receive as just compensation upon
a taking of that property by the State or the United States in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain .... The principles governing the ascertainment of value for purposes of
cases and
taxation are the same as those that control in condemnation cases, confiscation
7
generally in controversies involving the ascertainment of just compensation." Therefore,
to tax property at a valuation other than its true and full value for condemnation purposes
is to take property without making just compensation, and this violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To take the last step in this chain of reasoning, the majority opinion disregards the
essence of the doctrine long established that over-valuation alone is6 not enough to justify
setting aside a tax but that intentional discrimination must be shown. It does lip service to
that doctrine, after a fashion, in these words: "Over-valuation is not of itself sufficient to
warrant an injunction against any part of the taxes based on the challenged assessment;
mere error of judgment is not enough; there must be something that in legal effect is the
2. 77 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
3. Justices Stone, Cardozo and Brandeis
dissenting; majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
4. 56 S.Ct. at 429.
5. 4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed., 1924)
1612.
6. 56 S. Ct. at 436.

7. 56 S.Ct. at 428.
8. Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County,
260 U. S. 441 (1922); Iowa-Des Moines
Bank v. Bennette, 284 U. S.239 (1931);
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U. S.
23 (1931); Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); Raymond
v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
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equivalent of intention or fraudulent purpose to overoalue the property and so to set at
naught fundamental principles that safeguard the taxpayer's rights and property", citing
Rowley v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. 9 In the case referred to, the question of discrimina-

tion was directly involved and had been alleged in the petition. In his opinion there, Justice
Butler said: "Over-valuation resulting from error of judgment will not support a claim of
discrimination. There must be something amounting to an intention, or the equivalent of
fraudulent purpose, to disregard the fundamental principle of uniformity. There was no discrimination against respondent by the undervaluation of the property of others." This is
very different from the statement in the principal case. It says nothing about an intention
merely to overvalue. It goes further and says not only that discrimination must be shown
but that such discrimination must be intentional. In the principal case, discrimination is
not even alleged.
The majority opinion makes another assumption that seems unfounded. It assumes
that valuation of property for purposes of taxation involves the same considerations as
valuation for purposes of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and its decision is
grounded upon considerations ofjust compensation in terms of due process. The distinction
between the power of taxation and the power of eminent domain, and between the purposes
for which they are exercised, are matters not considered by this opinion. Yet the distinction
is clear, and the nature of these different powers should be the guide in determining the application of the Constitution to these powers.
"The power of taxation is the power of the sovereign state to require from individuals
a contribution of money or other property, as and for their respective shares of contribution
to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by eminent domain is taken, not
as the owner's share of contribution to the public burden, but as so much beyond his share.
Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case, because the government is a
debtor for the property so taken; but not in the former, because payment of taxes is a duty,
and creates no obligation to repay, otherwise than in the proper application of the tax.
Taxation operates on the community or a class of persons in the community, and by some
rule of apportionment, while the exercise of the right of eminent domain operates on the
individual,and without reference to the amount or value exacted from any other individual or
class of individuals.... Property may be taken under the taxing power without making any
direct compensation whatever, the foundation for this power being in an absolute political
necessity, compensation to the taxpayer being merely theoretical and incidental. Hence, the
constitutional provisions prohibiting a taking of private property for public use without
making just compensation do not apply to taxation."' 0 Taxes must be paid to meet governmental expenses, however great, and a taxpayer cannot complain simply because taxes are
heavy. Justice Stone in his dissent says: "The activities and expenses of government over
which the State has plenary control do not cease during a depression. They may increase.
The State may meet these expenses by raising the valuation of taxable property, or by
raising tax rates, or both, without infringing any constitutional immunity.... The Constitution guarantees no immunity from taxation, even though the tax, because of its amount,
may be burdensome."" Thus it is apparent that the Constitution makes only one guarantee
with respect to taxation, namely, that the burden will be imposed uniformly and so distributed among those who must bear it that none will bear an undue share of the burden. This
guarantee is to be found in the equal protection clause. As to the amount of the tax that
may be imposed, the Constitution is silent.
There is language in some of the cases that might suggest that a tax will be set aside
if arbitrary and excessive, even though no discrimination is shown. It is sometimes said that
equity will set aside a tax that is "arbitrary or discriminatory." But an examination of the
9. 293 U. S.102 (1934).
10. 10 R. C. L. 8; Gilman v. Sheboygan,
67 U. S.788 (1863); Chicago B. & Q. Ry.
v. Otoe County, 83 U. S. 667 (1873);
Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S.691
(1881); Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson,
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173 U. S. 592 (1899); cf.Nichols v. Coolidge,
274 U. S. 531 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U. S. 142 (1928); Untermeyer v.
Anderson, 276 U. S.440 (1928).
11. 56 S. Ct. at 436, 437.
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cases will disclose that only where a so-called "arbitrary and excessive" tax has worked out
so as to discriminate against a particular taxpayer has the tax been set aside."
The cases cited by Justice Butler in the majority opinion as definitive of the "principles
that govern property valuation" do not support the decision. Fargo v. Hart" and Rowley v.
Chicago & Northwestern Ry.14 involved excessive allocation of system value to the taxing
State, a question expressly decided in favor of the Board in the principal case. Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. U. 8.15 set aside an improper valuation for condemnation purposes. It
has been pointed out that the due process clause providing just compensation for property
Southwestern Tel. Co. v. PublicService Comm.", Bluefield
so taken does not apply to taxation.
18
7
Co. v. Public Service Comm.' , and McCardle v. IndianapolisCo.

set aside improper valua-

tions for purposes of determining whether public utility rates were confiscatory. Confiscation,
through rate regulation denying a reasonable return (like too low a valuation in condemnation
cases), is exactly the sort of a taking of property which is prohibited by the due process
clause. Plaintiff in the principal case complains simply that the Board took the 1932 valuation of its property as a basis for 1933 taxes, without any showing that the Board did not use
the 1932 valuation as a basis for the taxation of other property in the State. It shows no
inequality in the distribution of the tax burden, and it is only this inequality against which
the Constitution guarantees any immunity. Justice Stone said: "Recently we held that a
claim that rate of a non-discriminatory tax is excessive presents no constitutional question.
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44. No reason has been advanced at the bar, or
given in the opinion of the court, why a tax valuation, excessive when compared with condemnation or market value, should have any different legal consequences. In neither case
is inequality of the tax burden established. It is for that reason that this court has held,
without exception, that valuation of property for tax purposes, however excessive, not shown
to be discriminatory, infringes no constitutional immunity", 9 citing Rowley v. Chicago &

Northwestern Ry. 20, Southern Ry. v. Watts,"2 Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board,2 and Sunday
Lake Shore Co. v. W~akefield.2

If, as the principal case seems to decide, a taxpayer may come into equity and have a
tax set aside on the single showing that his own individual assessment is in excess of the
value of his pxoperty for condemnation purposes, it would seem not only that a new protection is construed into the Constitution, but that the Federal Courts are opened to a flood of
litigation. The only constitutional guarantee hitherto recognized with respect to taxation
is that the burden will be equally distributed. The doctrine of the principal case seems to be
that the Federal Courts will review any assessment of a State Board on the single allegation
that it is excessive. This, it is submitted, is both contrary to established principles and productive of a definitely undesirable result. It is difficult to see how even a grossly excessive
valuation of property for taxing purposes, as measured by its condemnation or market value,
is a taking of property without due process unless other taxable property is assessed on a different basis so that non-uniformity in the imposition of the burden results. "It is only this
discrimination against which the Constitution makes any guarantee.
ROBERT A. WINGER
TRIAL PRACTICE-INSTRUCTIONS-FAILURE

TO REQUEST.

Arnold v. May Department Stores Co.'
2
Brown v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis

These two cases hold in substance that allowing a personal injury suit to go to the jury
over the defendant's objection and exception, in that regard, on a single instruction of the

plaintiff respecting the measure of damages was not reversible when defendant's own general
12. L. R. A. 1916A, 972.
13. 193 U. S. 490 (1904).
14. 293 U. S. 102 (1934).
15. 148 U. S. 312 (1893).
16. 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
17. 262 U. S. 679 (1923).
18. 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
19. 56 S. Ct. at 436.

20.
21.
22.
23.

293
260
284
247

U. S. 102 (1934).
U. S. 519 (1923).
U. S. 23 (1931).
U. S. 350 (1918).

1. 85 S. W. (2d) 748 (Mo. 1935).
2. 85 S. W. (2d) 226 (Mo. App. 1935).
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instructions sufficiently covered the case. Thus, again is presented the much controverted
question, whether it is reversible error for the trial court to permit a civil case to go to the
jury over the objection of the defendant after plaintiff has failed to submit any instructions
other than a measure of damage instruction.
In a very early case, the Supreme Court of Missouri said: "It is, certainly, the duty
of the Circuit Courts, to instruct the jury on all principles of law which may be applicable
refusal must
to the facts in evidence before them, and to refuse to do so is error; but the
3
appear in the record by bill of exceptions, to enable this court to correct it." This language
is not entirely clear, but it seems to mean that although a duty rested upon the court to
instruct, it was only error to fail to instruct when a proper instruction had been requested.
In any event, a few years later the rule that mere non-direction is not error was definitely
established when the court refused to set aside a verdict where a case was submitted to the
jury without instructions since none were asked which could throw any light upon any legal
question raised by the evidence. 4 That is, the failure to instruct is not error unless appropriate instructions were requested and refused.5 This rule was long followed in Missouri,67
and is clearly the rule of practice in the majority of jurisdictions in this country today.
The Missouri Supreme Court long recognized the defects of this rule. In one case it
said,"The idea possessed by some lawyers that an instruction on the measure of damages in a
personal injury case is all that they should attempt to write for fear of getting error in the
record isan idea which, when put into practice, should be promptly condemned. There
should in all cases be at least one principal instruction outlining to thejury the theory under
the petition upon which recovery is sought. The jury should not be left to gather the theory
of recovery from the petition aided solely by a formal instruction upon the measure of
damages. Nor should the counsel cast the burden on a trial judge to draw such an instruction." 8 This warning was repeated often in later cases and paved the way for the
change which was soon to come. 9
10
In 1934, Dorman v. East St. Louis Railway Co. was decided. There the trial judge,
over the objection and exception of the defendant, allowed a case for personal injuries to go
to the jury on a single instruction of the pjaintiff as to the measure of damages together with
general instructions requested by the defendant. In regard to the instructions requested
by the defendant and given by the trial court the Supreme Court said: "These instructions
very clearly and definitely stated facts, which if found by the jury, would entitle defendant
to a verdict. They also very clearly and definitely set forth what purported to be plaintiff's
allegations of negligence, and advised the jury that 'before plaintiff can recover under said
allegations she must prove the same to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury by a prepond3. McKnight & Brady v. Wells, 1 Mo.
14 (1821). See also Coleman v. Roberts, 1
Mo. 97 (1821); Nicholas v. The State, 6
Mo. 6 (1839).
4. Drury v. White, 10 Mo. 354 (1847).
5. (1916) 14 R. C. L. 795.
6. Penn v. Lewis, 12 Mo. 161 (1848);
Tetherow v. The St. Joseph & Des Moines
Railroad Co., 98 Mo. 74, 11 S. W. 310
(1888); Coleman v. Drane, 116 Mo. 387, 22
S. W. 801 (1893); Feary v. O'Neill, 149 Mo.
467, 50 S. W. 918 (1899); Brown v. Globe
Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 112 S. W. 462
(1908); Erickson v. Lundgren, 37 S. W. (2d)
629 (Mo. 1931); Luikart v. Miller, 48 S. W.
(2d) 867 (Mo. 1932); Cahill v. Liggett and
Meyers, 14 Mo. App. 596 (1884); Kinsolving
v. Kinsolving, 194 S. W. 530 (Mo. App.
1917); Biskup v. Hoffman, 220 Mo. App.
542,287 S. W. 865 (1926); Sneed v. St. Louis,
Public Service Co., 53 S. W. (2d) 1062 (Mo.
App. 1932).
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Early 1912) § 2341. See cases collected in
(1916) 14 R. C. L. 795 n. 16.
8. Eversole v. Wabash Railroad Co.,
249 Mo. 523, 155 S. W. 419 (1913).
9. Sutter v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.,
188 S. W. 65 (Mo. 1916); Denkman v.
Prudential Fixture Co., 289 S. W. 591 (Mo.
1926); Shumate v. Wells, 320 Mo. 536, 9
S. W. (2d) 632 (1928); Barr v. Nafziger
Baking Co., 328 Mo. 423, 41 S. W. (2d)
559 (1931); Bello v. Stuever, 44 S. W. (2d)
619 (Mo. 1931); Luikart v. Miller, 48 S. W.
(2d) 867 (Mo. 1932); Young v. Wheelock,
333 Mo. 992, 64 S. W. (2d) 950 (1933);
Iman v. Walter Freund Bread Co., 332 Mo.
461, 58 S. W. (2d) 477 (1933); Freeman v.
Berberich, 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393
(1933); Buchanan v. Rechner, 333 Mo.
634, 62 S. W. (2d) 1071 (1933).
10. 335 Mo. 1052, 75 S. W. (2d) 854
(1934).
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1
erance or greater weight of the evidence'."" The court held that in view of these instructions
it was clear that thejury in this case was sufficiently instructed on the whole case, and since
as a result the defendant was not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to submit an instruction
setting forth her theory of liability, the action of the court in submitting the case to the jury
was not prejudicial error. If prejudice had resulted to the losing party, by reason of failure
to state to the jury the law of the case, and the point had been properly saved, it seems that
the judgment would have been reversed and the cause remanded for retrial. In the course
of the opinion the Supreme Court said that it is the duty of the trial judge to see that the
jury is instructed as to the issues and the law, and that the trial judge should refuse to submit the case until this is done; that the plaintiff can rightfully be required to formulate and
request the court to give an instruction informing the jury of the theory upon which he seeks
recovery, for this burden should not devolve upon the trial judge. A failure in this respect
constitutes at least prima facia error. The court expressly disapproved the earlier decisions
holding that mere non-direction is not error, adding, "Our previous rulings inconsistent with
the views herein expressed are disapproved and should no longer be followed."12

Two more recent cases involve the application of the rule laid down in the Dorman case
In Arnold o. May DepartmentStores Co.13, the Supreme Court held that it was not reversible
error to permit a personal injury case to go to the jury after the plaintiff had failed to submit
instructions other than a measure of damages instruction, when the trial court gave an
instruction at defendant's request which clearly and concisely told the jury that no greater
burden rested upon defendant than to exercise ordinary care. It was said that defendant's
instruction was sufficient on the whole case, and that defendant was not prejudiced by
the failure of plaintiff to submit an instruction predicating the facts relied upon for recovery.
But the Supreme Court approved the doctrine laid down in the Dorman case, namely, that
the plaintiff is not entitled to go to the jury unless he submits an instruction hypothesizing
his theory of recovery, and that to allow him to do so over objection is at least prima facia
error.
14
In Brown v. TerminalRy. Jss'n.of St. Louis, an action involving personal injuries, the
plaintiff failed to submit an instruction hypothesizing his theory of recovery. The trial court
allowed the case to go to the jury over defendant's objection and exception in that regard,
on a single instruction of the plaintiff respecting the measure of damages, together with certain instructions offered by the defendant. Defendant appealed, assigning as error the failure
to give an instruction setting forth plaintiff's theory of recovery. It was held that, although
no instruction was given stating the specific negligent act or acts of defendant that would
have to to proved to entitle plaintiff to a verdict, reversible error was not committed for the
defendant was not prejudiced by the omission of such an instruction.
All these cases involved actions for personal injuries, but as pointed out by a recent
5
writer, there is no reason to believe that the application of the rule laid down in these cases
will be restricted to actions for personal injuries.
A few jurisdictions meet the problem presented by the Dorman case by placing the
burden of instructing the jury upon the trial judge. In these jurisdictions, even though the
parties do not submit instructions, it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury.16 These
jurisdictions forsee the injustice which would likely result from submitting the case to a jury
composed of inexperienced laymen, with nothing more than their conscience as a guide and
their sense of justice as law, and allowing them to render a verdict.
Although the courts held in the Missouri cases discussed above that the trial courts
did not commit reversible error in submitting the case to the jury, it would seem that these
11. Id. 75S.W. (2d) at860.
12. Id. 75 S. W. (2d) at 859.
13. 85 S. W. (2d) 748 (Mo. 1935).
14. 85 S. W. (2d) 226 (Mo. App. 1935).
15. Note (1935) 20 ST. Louis L. REv.
16. Rowell v. Town of Vershire, 62 Vt.
405, 19 Atl. 990 (1890); Teasley v. Bradley,
110 Ga. 497, 35 S. E. 782 (1900); Hillton,
etc., Lumber Co. v. Ingram, 119 Ga. 652,

46 S. E. 895 (1904); Wise v. Oultrim, 139
Iowa 192, 117 N. W. 264 (1908); Schwaninger v. McNeeley and Co., 44 Wash. 447,
87 Pac. 514 (1906); Mahoney v. Gooch, 264
Mass. 467, 141 N. E. 605 (1923); Blue Valley
Bank v. Melburn, 120 Neb. 421, 232 N. W.
777 (1930); Milyak v. Philadelphia Rural
Transit Co., 300 Pa. 457, 150 At. 622
(1930).
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cases stand for the following propositions: It is reversible error for a trial court to permit a
case to go to the jury, over defendant's objection, on a single instruction respecting the measure of damages. On the other hand, it is not reversible error for the trial court to permit a
case to go to the jury after the plaintiff has failed to submit instructions other than a measure
of damage instruction, if instructions given, even though general, sufficiently cover the rules
of law applicable to the evidence and the issues in the case. Therefore, the safe thing for a
plaintiff to do, is to submit an instruction hypothesizing his theory of recovery. But if
plaintiff fails to submit such an instruction, the defendant should object to the case going
to the jury and refuse to offer any instructions whatever, for if the case is submitted to jury
over defendant's objection but on instructions given at the request of defendant, it may be
held that defendant was not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to offer an instruction hypothesizing his theory of recovery.
LAWRENCE ROBERT BRowN
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